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FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN FLORIDA BANKRUPTCY COURTS: 




Bankruptcy proceedings have become increasingly complex in the twenty-first 
century given that it is no longer uncommon for a modern debtor to have assets and 
liabilities spread across multiple jurisdictions. Creditors must be especially vigilant 
in their monitoring and collection efforts since they are expected to operate across 
state lines, each with its own legal peculiarities. Ideally, bankruptcy would be 
universally consistent, operating under a single code and a singular body of federal 
case law. However, the reality is that bankruptcy law is not as monolithic or uniform 
as it is sometimes portrayed. The interplay between state and federal law often 
creates strange outcomes and stands as a confusing minefield for bankruptcy 
practitioners.  
Unfortunately, Florida is especially susceptible to this kind of confusion. It has 
long been labeled as a “Debtor’s Paradise”1 because of its expansive homestead 
protections2 and other laws favorable to wealthy people on the run from their 
creditors. That, along with the sheer number of transplants that move into the state 
each year, inevitably leads to the state’s bankruptcy courts having to juggle the 
interests of many different states. The results are not always uniform or satisfying 
from an academic perspective. From a practical perspective, the breadth of 
inconsistent case law can be difficult to navigate.  
Other scholarly works have explored choice-of-law questions in a much broader 
way than this article will attempt.3 Instead, this article will focus on the practical 
considerations that attorneys must face when encountering a choice-of-law question 
in the bankruptcy context and will focus on a type of claim that necessarily invokes 
the laws of more than one jurisdiction. Namely, this article will have a particular 
emphasis on the enforceability of judgments in bankruptcy courts, where the 
judgment was rendered in a state other than that of the state in which the bankruptcy 
court sits. There will be a particular emphasis on analyzing how out-of-state 
 ________________________  
      
*
  
Attorney, Boca Raton, FL; J.D., Tulane University Law School; B.A., University of Florida. 
 1. Larry Rohter, Rich Debtors Finding Shelter Under a Populist Florida Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 1993), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/25/us/rich-debtors-finding-shelter-under-a-populist-florida-law.html.  
 2. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4. 
 3. See, e.g., Michael S. Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865, 1872 (2013); Viktoria 
A.D. Ziebarth, Choice-of-Law Rules in Bankruptcy: An Opportunity for Congress to Resolve Conflicting 
Approaches, 5 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 309, 314 (2010); Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of 
Law, and Same-Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L. REV. 881, 882 (2006); John T. Cross, State Choice of Law Rules in 
Bankruptcy, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 531, 533–34 (1989).  
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judgments are enforced in bankruptcy courts located in Florida; however, this article 
will also explore how courts in other states have handled similar issues. 
I. CHOICE OF LAW IN BANKRUPTCY, GENERALLY 
Choice of law in bankruptcy is an unexpectedly unsettled question.4 Given that 
bankruptcy necessarily involves both state and federal law,5 this can sometimes be 
disheartening for the bankruptcy attorney in his or her day-to-day practice. It is all 
the more troubling in the modern age of debtors that have assets and liabilities 
located in and originating from multiple jurisdictions. For federal courts sitting in 
diversity, judges at least have some definitive guidance from the Supreme Court of 
the United States. The Court’s 1941 decision, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric 
Manufacturing Co.,6 held that federal courts whose jurisdiction derives from the 
diversity of the parties should look to the forum state’s choice-of-law rules.7 It cited 
the principle of “uniformity within a state” as an important consideration in its 
decision, as well as conformity with those concerns detailed in the seminal case of 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,8 which had been decided just a few years earlier.9 
Unfortunately, the Court did not see fit to instruct future litigants on whether the 
answer would be the same for a court whose jurisdiction is based on a federal 
question.10 When given the opportunity to clarify the conflict shortly after Klaxon, 
the Court essentially punted.11 
Bankruptcy courts, perhaps because of their broad grant of jurisdiction that 
stands somewhere in between federal question and diversity jurisdiction,12 have 
significantly more discretion (or some would say lack of guidance) on what choice-
of-law rules to apply to each case. The trend for most courts seems to be simply to 
apply the forum state’s choice-of-law rules without offering any legal justification, 
 ________________________  
 4. Generally, when this article refers to “choice of law,” it is referring to the threshold question bankruptcy 
courts must face when encountering an issue that implicates more than one jurisdiction: Should the court use the 
choice-of-law analysis developed by federal courts or by state courts? If it decides that a state court analysis is 
necessary, which state’s analysis should the court choose? 
 5. Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000) (“The ‘basic federal rule’ in bankruptcy is that 
state law governs the substance of claims, Congress having ‘generally left the determination of property rights in 
the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law.’”) (citations omitted) (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 
54, 57 (1979)).  
 6. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).  
 7. Id. at 496.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942) (“Whether the rule of the Klaxon case 
applies where federal jurisdiction is not based on diversity of citizenship, we need not decide.”).  
 11. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 162 (1946).  
In determining what claims are allowable and how a debtor’s assets shall be distributed, a bankruptcy court does not 
apply the law of the state where it sits. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, has no such implication. That case 
decided that a federal district court acquiring jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship should adjudicate 
controversies as if it were only another state court. 
Id. Since the Court made this proclamation, bankruptcy courts have been doomed to apply a more complicated 
choice-of-law analysis, rather than utilize a much simpler approach of applying the law of the forum state to any 
question.  
 12. See Gardina, supra note 3, at 908 (discussing how the nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction implicates a 
mixture of both federal question and diversity jurisdiction).  
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or to cite the Klaxon decision as applicable precedent.13 While practical, this result 
is perhaps a bit unsatisfying from an academic perspective. Without any guidance 
from the Supreme Court, and with the circuits currently split on the issue,14 this still-
unresolved issue remains applicable to modern-day practitioners, over seventy years 
after the Klaxon decision.15  
The Bankruptcy Code has surprisingly little to say about the matter. The term 
“claim” is defined broadly as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, 
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”16 Section 
502 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs the allowance of claims in bankruptcy, 
provides that a claim should be allowed unless an interested party objects to the 
claim.17 It further provides that when an objection to a claim is made, the bankruptcy 
court must determine whether “such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and 
property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law.”18 Of course, the 
phrase “applicable law” is undefined. The definition of that phrase is essentially the 
fundamental question posed by this article and has been the subject of much 
consternation among academics, practitioners, and jurists for a number of decades.  
The role of the bankruptcy court is often that of a gatekeeper, determining which 
claims are valid against the debtor and which must be discarded as specious, 
satisfied, untimely, or otherwise unenforceable if not for the bankruptcy proceeding 
itself.19 In fact, the “allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate” is one 
of the most essential functions of a bankruptcy court and is a “core proceeding” under 
the Bankruptcy Code.20 Although a bankruptcy filing is often the “last call” for 
creditors who wish to seek recompense, a claim should not be permitted unless a 
creditor could have sought payment from the debtor prior to the bankruptcy.21 “In 
other words, a claim against the bankruptcy estate will not be allowed in a 
bankruptcy proceeding if the same claim would not be enforceable against the debtor 
outside of bankruptcy.”22 Courts have interpreted this to mean that “any defense to a 
claim that is available outside of the bankruptcy context is also available in 
bankruptcy.”23 This is because a creditor’s entitlement to a claim in bankruptcy arises 
 ________________________  
 13. Cross, supra note 3, at 543–45 and the cases cited therein.  
 14. See Bianco v. Erkins (In re Gaston & Snow), 243 F.3d 599, 605 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing cases among 
various circuits).  
 15. Gardina, supra note 3, at 909–10 (discussing the chaos caused by the lack of guidance from the Supreme 
Court and its effect on modern cases). 
 16. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012).  
 17. Id. § 502(a).  
 18. Id. § 502(b)(1). 
 19. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305–10 (1939) (discussing the role of the bankruptcy court as a court 
of equity). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)(B) (2012); see also In re Distrigas Corp., 75 B.R. 770, 772 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1987) (“The ability of the bankruptcy judge to rule on claims against the estate is central to the bankruptcy system.”).  
 21. United States v. Sanford (In re Sanford), 979 F.2d 1511, 1513 (11th Cir. 1992); see also 11 U.S.C. § 
502(b)(1). 
 22. In re Sanford, 979 F.2d at 1513. 
 23. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 127 S. Ct. 1199, 1201 (2007).  
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“from the underlying substantive law creating the debtor’s obligation,” requiring the 
bankruptcy court to look to state law in determining the enforceability of the claim.24  
Timing of the underlying claim is also a factor. Section 502 instructs courts to 
determine whether a claim is enforceable against the debtor “as of the date of the 
filing of the petition.”25 “A plain reading of [§ 502] thus suggests that the bankruptcy 
court should determine whether a creditor’s claim is enforceable against the debtor 
as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed.”26 Although the bankruptcy is filed 
in one court, located in only one state, the creditors often come from many different 
jurisdictions with claims that are in many different stages of collection. Thus, many 
different states’ laws may be implicated by a single bankruptcy proceeding. As this 
article will explore in much greater depth infra, this timing element to § 502 has 
important implications for statutes of limitations on a creditor’s claim.27  
The power of the bankruptcy court to resolve claims against the estate also 
extends to making rulings that may affect the ultimate disposition of related state 
court actions. When a state court claim is “necessarily resolved by a ruling on a 
creditor’s proof of claim,” then the bankruptcy court has the authority to make such 
a final determination.28 A bankruptcy court may abstain from making a 
determination on a claim where “there is no escaping the fact that the resolution of 
the state lawsuit will be the basis for either a claim or a defense to a claim” in the 
bankruptcy case.29 However, the court should only exercise its discretionary power 
to abstain “sparingly and cautiously,”30 and the abstention provision should be 
“narrowly construed.”31 Although bankruptcy courts may abstain because an issue 
implicates state law, that alone cannot be the sole factor in a decision to abstain.32 
Suffice it to say, bankruptcy courts must be vigilant when navigating the 
“jurisdictional maze constructed by Congress”33 with respect to the relationship 
between bankruptcy law and state law.  
II. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN FLORIDA BANKRUPTCIES 
While choice-of-law questions intrigue academics, bankruptcy practitioners may 
not encounter them on a regular basis, at least not explicitly. However, with debtors 
that have assets and liabilities in multiple jurisdictions, the laws of these separate 
jurisdictions will inevitably clash. Although other types of claims will be discussed, 
this section will focus on a specific type of claim that may be presented in a Florida 
 ________________________  
 24. Id. (quoting Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)).  
 25. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2015).  
 26. Cadle Co. v. Mangan (In re Flanagan), 503 F.3d 171, 179 (2d Cir. 2007).  
 27. In re Ballato, 188 B.R. 690, 693 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). 
 28. Sundale, Ltd. v. Fla. Assocs. Capital Enters., LLC, No. 11-20635-CIV, 2012 WL 488110, at *17–18 
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2012) (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011)).  
 29. Williams v. Assocs. Fin., Inc. (In re Williams), 88 B.R. 187, 189 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).  
 30. In re Climate Control Eng’rs, Inc., 51 B.R. 359, 363 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).  
 31. Hillsborough Holdings Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 123 B.R. 1004, 1010 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).  
 32. Harley Hotels, Inc. v. Rain’s Int’l, Ltd., 57 B.R. 773, 782 (Bankr. M.D. Penn. 1985) (“While the interests 
of comity and respect for state court processes are important ones, they are insufficient, standing alone, to warrant 
abstention in this case.”) (citation omitted).  
 33. In re S.E. Hornsby & Sons Sand & Gravel Co., 45 B.R. 988, 990 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).  
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bankruptcy proceeding—a foreign34 judgment entered against the bankruptcy 
debtor—and how a court would determine whether that claim is enforceable against 
the debtor. Decisions made by courts located outside of Florida will be examined as 
well, given that they are often looked to by district court judges for guidance.  
Under Florida law, there are two ways a party may enforce a foreign judgment: 
it may bring a “traditional common law action” to enforce the judgment in a state 
court,35 or it may domesticate the judgment using the Florida Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments Act (FEFJA).36 Under the FEFJA, a judgment creditor “must simply 
record the foreign judgment in the clerk’s office.”37 Once recorded in this fashion 
and once the judgment debtor has been properly noticed, the foreign judgment will 
have the same effect as any judgment of a Florida state court,38 and shall 
(theoretically) be entitled to the twenty-year statute of limitations afforded to Florida 
judgments.39  
Of course, for bankruptcies that find their way to district courts in the State of 
Florida, foreign judgments that have been properly domesticated in Florida are dealt 
with relatively easily in the claims process.40 More complex issues arise in the event 
that a bankruptcy petition is filed in Florida by a debtor that has one or more 
unsatisfied foreign judgments that have not yet been domesticated in the state. One 
of the most common—and most troubling in the case of a judgment creditor—
problems that can arise is Florida’s statute of limitations, given that it treats 
judgments rendered by a Florida court much more favorably than those rendered by 
any other court.41 Florida’s statute of limitations provides in relevant part:  
 
Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced 
as follows:  
 ________________________  
 34. FLA. STAT. §§ 55.501–55.509 (2015). This article uses the term “foreign” judgment as defined in the 
Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. There, the term is defined as “a judgment, decree, or order of a 
court of any other state, territory or commonwealth of the United States, or of the United States if such judgment, 
decree, or order is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.” See FLA. STAT. § 55.502(1). While most of the 
concepts described herein would most likely apply to judgments rendered by courts outside of the United States, any 
exceptions created by the international bankruptcy sphere are outside the scope of this article.  
 35. 645 W. 44th St. Assocs. v. Koch, No. 13-61475, 2014 WL 1652035, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2014) 
(citing In re Goodwin, 325 B.R. 328, 330 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005)). Enactment of the FEFJA eliminated the 
traditional requirement of creditors with foreign judgments having to file an action in order to domesticate it in 
Florida. Michael v. Valley Trucking Co., 832 So. 2d 213, 215 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002). “[The Florida 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act] shall not be construed to impair the right of a judgment creditor to bring an 
action to enforce his or her judgment instead of proceeding under this act.” Fla. Stat. § 55.502(2). See generally 
Crane v. Nuta, 26 So.2d 670 (Fla. 1946).   
 36. Koch, 2014 WL 1652035, at *4. 
 37. Haigh v. Planning Bd., 940 So. 2d 1230, 1233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (citing FLA. STAT. § 55.503(1), 
55.502(2) (2005)). The only qualification is that the foreign judgment must still be effective in the state in which it 
was rendered, Muka v. Horizon Financial Corp., 766 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), meaning you cannot 
breathe new life into a judgment that had already died in its home state. 
 38. FLA. STAT. § 55.503(1) (2015). 
 39. Id. § 95.11 (2015). 
 40. See, e.g., Policemen’s & Firefighters’ Ret. Fund of Covington, Ky. v. Tranter (In re Tranter), 245 B.R. 
419, 421–22 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000). Some courts, however, have still managed to complicate this seemingly simple 
issue. 
 41. Id. at 422. 
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(1) Within twenty years.—An action on a judgment or decree of a 
court of record in this state. 
(2) Within five years.—  
(a) An action on a judgment or decree of any court, not of record, 
of this state or any court of the United States, any other state or 
territory in the United States, or a foreign country.42 
Based on this statute, creditors holding a judgment rendered by a court outside of 
Florida older than five years would justifiably be worried if the judgment debtor filed 
a bankruptcy petition in a federal district court in Florida.43 
While there are no precedential decisions for bankruptcy courts in Florida to 
look to when analyzing this situation, there are several cases that can offer guidance. 
In Balfour Beatty Bahamas, Ltd. v. Bush,44 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit was called upon to interpret how Florida’s statute of limitations 
interacts with foreign judgments.45 Even though the Bush case did not implicate 
bankruptcy law, it is instructive with respect to the fundamental question bankruptcy 
courts must ask when presented with a claim: Is this claim enforceable under Florida 
law? In the case, a judgment creditor who obtained a default judgment in a federal 
district court located in Florida sought to begin collection efforts against the 
judgment debtor over six years after the judgment had been entered.46 The judgment 
debtor argued that the creditor could no longer enforce the judgment pursuant to 
section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes, because more than five years had passed since 
the judgment was entered.47 The Eleventh Circuit thus had to determine whether the 
judgment obtained in the federal district court was controlled by a statute of 
limitations period of five years or twenty years.48  
The Eleventh Circuit first noted that the creditor’s collection efforts were 
“controlled, at the time of execution, by the ‘practice[s] and procedure[s] of the state 
in which the district court is held.’”49 Since the judgment had been obtained in 
Florida and efforts to execute on the judgment were taking place in a district court 
located in Florida, Florida’s state law was used.50 The Eleventh Circuit determined 
that the five-year limitations period of section 95.11(2)(a) should apply “with respect 
to the unique facts presented here, i.e., an attempt to enforce a district court 
judgment, entered in the Southern District of Florida, in the same district court.”51  
 ________________________  
 42. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(1)–(2)(a).  
 43. As one would imagine, Florida is far from the only state to have different limitation periods for foreign 
and domestic judgments. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that this type of statutory scheme is fully 
compatible with the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 
188, 191 (1966).  
 44. Balfour Beatty Bah., Ltd. v. Bush, 170 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 45. Id. at 1049. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1050 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)).  
 50. Bush, 170 F.3d at 1050. 
 51. Id. at 1051.  
6
Barry Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol21/iss2/1
Spring 2016 Foreign Judgments in Florida Bankruptcy Courts 169 
 
The Eleventh Circuit based the reasoning for its holding almost entirely upon a 
decision from the Florida First District Court of Appeal.52 In Kiesel v. Graham, the 
plaintiff had obtained a judgment in the Southern District of Florida and was seeking 
to enforce it in a state court in Leon County, Florida almost six years after the 
judgment was entered.53 The First District closely analyzed section 95.11 to 
determine whether enforcement of the judgment was barred by the five-year statute 
of limitations and noted the internal inconsistency in the statute.54 Section 95.11(1) 
provides that “[a]n action on a judgment or decree of a court of record in this state” 
shall commence within twenty years; whereas section 95.11(2)(a) provides that “[a]n 
action on a judgment or decree of . . . any court of the United States” shall commence 
within five years.55 “Both of the above statutory provisions,” the First District noted, 
“appear to govern the instant situation, for the subject judgment is that ‘of a court of 
record in this state’ as well as that ‘of any court of the United States.’”56 To resolve 
this conflict, the First District looked to the rules of statutory construction, and it 
determined that because the phrase “‘of any court of the United States’ is more 
specific than ‘‘of a court of record in this state,’” then the more specific phrase should 
control with respect to federal courts.57 
The Eleventh Circuit in Bush, found this logic “well-reasoned” and thus held 
that the five-year limitations period in section 95.11(2)(a) controlled with respect to 
the creditor’s judgment entered in the Southern District of Florida.58 As a result, a 
judgment entered in a federal court—even a federal court located in the State of 
Florida—is subject to a five-year limitation period despite the fact that the creditor 
seeks to enforce the judgment in that same federal court.59 This case demonstrates 
the pitfalls that sometimes occur when federal courts are compelled to apply state 
law. While the Bush case did not originate in bankruptcy court, it can certainly be 
used in bankruptcy proceedings to determine whether a judgment entered in a federal 
district court in Florida is enforceable against a debtor in bankruptcy. It stands to 
reason that, due to the Bush decision, a particular judgment creditor’s claim would 
be barred if the judgment was older than five years at the time the petition was filed.60  
Several lower courts have rendered more specific decisions with respect to how 
foreign judgments would be affected in Florida bankruptcies. In a case originating 
from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, a creditor 
sought to enforce a New York judgment against a debtor that later established 
residence in Florida.61 The court used Florida’s statute of limitations as “the 
applicable law” and held that because more than five years had passed, the claim was 
 ________________________  
 52. Id. at 1050–51. 
 53. Kiesel v. Graham, 388 So. 2d 594, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).  
 54. See id. 
 55. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(1)–(2)(a) (2015).  
 56. Kiesel, 388 So. 2d at 595.  
 57. Id. at 595–96.  
 58. Balfour Beatty Bah., Ltd. v. Bush, 170 F.3d 1048, 1051 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. In re Ballato, 188 B.R. 690, 691, 693 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).  
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“unenforceable, and by virtue of § 502(b) must be disallowed.”62 The court did not 
view the fact that the judgment had been entered in New York to be relevant, nor did 
it conduct any kind of choice-of-law analysis before coming to the conclusion that 
Florida law regarding statute of limitations for enforceability of a foreign judgment 
should apply.63 Simply applying the law of the state in which the bankruptcy court 
resides is the most straightforward approach a court can make when determining the 
enforceability of a foreign judgment, and as this article notes infra, it is often the 
default route taken by judges.  
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Alford (In re Alford),64 a creditor 
sought to enforce a Louisiana judgment against the debtor in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceeding after the debtor had established residence in the State of Florida.65 The 
bankruptcy petition had been filed five years and four months after the creditor 
obtained the judgment in Louisiana.66 The creditor filed an adversary proceeding 
alleging that the debt was non-dischargeable.67 The Alford court explicitly applied 
Florida law as the “applicable law” pursuant to § 502(b), stating that “[t]he law 
applicable to this debtor is Florida law since that is the place of his residence and 
filing.”68 The court ultimately determined that the creditor’s filing of the adversary 
proceeding constituted an “action on a judgment,” as defined in section 95.11, and 
that the five-year limitation period applied to such foreign judgment actions.69  
The Alford case explicitly and implicitly raises a number of troubling issues for 
creditors. The first is that it appears, based on Alford and several other cases 
interpreting section 95.11, that a debtor may purposely avoid a judgment rendered 
by any court other than a Florida state court simply by filing a bankruptcy petition 
in Florida after five years have elapsed.70 On its face, this result seems at odds with 
the ideas of comity between the states and fundamental fairness for creditors and 
their ability to enforce debts. It also encourages the kind of “forum shopping” long 
discouraged by the Supreme Court and academics with respect to bankruptcy (and 
federal diversity jurisdiction in general).71 It is made all the worse that Florida 
already has a dubious reputation as a haven for those who are looking to cheat the 
bankruptcy system.72 To be fair, however, Florida is far from the only state with such 
prejudicial treatment of foreign judgments, as this article discusses infra.  
 ________________________  
 62. Id. at 693. 
 63. See id. 
 64. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Alford (In re Alford), 308 B.R. 563 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2002).  
 65. Id. at 565. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 568.  
 70. See In re Alford, 308 B.R. at 568–69. 
 71. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 827–28 (1987); see also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Uniform treatment 
of property interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum 
shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving ‘a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’”) 
(quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).  
 72. See generally John M. Norwood & Marianne M. Jennings, Before Declaring Bankruptcy, Move to 
Florida and Buy a House: The Ethics and Judicial Inconsistencies of Debtors’ Conversions and Exemptions, 28 SW. 
U. L. REV. 439, 440 (1999) (“[D]ebtors are now figuring out which liberal exemption states they should move to 
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Other federal courts sitting in Florida have also applied Florida law when 
determining whether a foreign judgment is enforceable against a debtor in 
bankruptcy,73 although some have done so in a peculiar way. For example, the 
Goodwin case dealt with the preferred avenue for creditors seeking to enforce out-
of-state judgments in Florida: the FEFJA.74 There, the court held that the creditor’s 
Maine judgment was properly recorded and recognized in Florida under the 
FEFJA.75 However, the court’s next task was to determine whether this newly-
domesticated judgment was entitled to Florida’s twenty-year statute of limitations or 
the five-year limitation period. The court noted that “Florida adopted a non-uniform 
clause in the FEFJA, which provides with reference to construing the Act, ‘(4) 
nothing contained in this act shall be construed to alter, modify, or extend the 
limitation period applicable for the enforcement of foreign judgments.’”76 Given the 
purpose of the FEFJA—to provide a uniform procedure for foreign judgments to 
“become Florida judgments for enforcement purposes”77—this provision is 
confusing, if not baffling. It seems to undermine the domesticated judgment’s new 
status as a Florida judgment and instead treats it, at least with respect to the limitation 
period, as a foreign judgment.  
The Goodwin court acknowledged the lack of clarity in this provision and thus 
sought the guidance of the Supreme Court of Florida, which had interpreted a similar 
act, the Uniform Out-of-Country Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act 
(UFMJRA),78 as well as the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal opinion that it 
affirmed.79 Although the Nadd decision did not expressly involve the FEFJA, the 
appellate court’s opinion analyzed it in detail in order to shed light on the 
UFMJRA.80 The Goodwin court expressly adopted the Fifth District’s interpretation 
of the FEFJA’s non-uniform provision, to wit: “The drafters of that provision may 
have wished to make ‘clear’ that the five-year statute remains as a bar to suits brought 
under the common law mode of enforcement, having referenced that remedy in a 
closely preceding provision.”81 This is probably the outcome most consistent with 
the purpose of the FEFJA, since it incentivizes the use of the FEFJA’s registration 
mechanisms while still maintaining Florida’s statute of limitations with respect to 
common law enforcement actions. However, uncertainty remains, especially since 
the Florida Supreme Court’s decision does not directly interpret the FEFJA.   
 ________________________  
before declaring bankruptcy so that they can maximize their exemptions. And so, retirees and the nearly bankrupt 
are descending upon Florida in record numbers both for the state’s sunshine and its liberal debtor exemptions.”).  
 73. In re Goodwin, 325 B.R. 328, 333–34 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (applying Florida law in holding that 
Maine judgment was properly domesticated in Florida and thus enforceable in bankruptcy); Policemen’s & 
Firefighters’ Ret. Fund of Covington, Ky. v. Tranter (In re Tranter) 245 B.R. 419, 421–22 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000) 
(reviewing FEFJA with respect to Kentucky Judgment); In re Conrad, 252 B.R. 559, 561–62 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2000) (enforcing California judgment).  
 74. In re Goodwin, 325 B.R. at 330. 
 75. Id. at 331.  
 76. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 55.502(4) (2004)).  
 77. Joannou v. Corsini, 543 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).  
 78. Nadd v. Le Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 804 So. 2d 1226, 1228, 1233–34 (Fla. 2001).  
 79. See Le Credit Lyonnais, S.A. v. Nadd, 741 So. 2d 1165, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).  
 80. See id. at 1168–72.  
 81. In re Goodwin, 325 B.R. at 332–33 (quoting Le Credit Lyonnais, 741 So. 2d at 1169).  
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The Alford decision, in somewhat of a contrast to Goodwin, held that “no 
limitations period is modified by the [FEFJA]” and that “the five-year limitations 
period applies to foreign judgments.”82 It insisted that this interpretation was 
“consistent with the Nadd cases,” since those involved the UFMJRA, not the 
FEFJA.83 However, it ultimately relies upon the factual distinction between the case 
in front of it at the time and the facts in Goodwin. In Goodwin, the foreign judgment 
had already been domesticated in Florida and the creditor was simply seeking 
enforcement of that judgment,84 whereas in Alford, the creditor had filed suit alleging 
that the debt based on the foreign judgment was non-dischargeable.85 This may at 
first glance seem like a distinction without a difference. However, judging by the 
many cases interpreting Florida’s statute of limitations scheme, the mechanism 
through which the creditor seeks enforcement of its debt can make all the difference 
in how much time the creditor has for enforcement.  
Another decision out of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida 
applied Florida law but came to a very different conclusion. In Tranter, the court 
was also called upon to interpret the FEFJA with respect to a foreign judgment.86 
There a creditor sought to have a debt arising from a judgment rendered in Kentucky 
declared non-dischargeable in the Florida bankruptcy proceeding.87 The Kentucky 
judgment had been domesticated in Florida two years prior to the debtor filing the 
bankruptcy petition; however, the judgment was originally entered in Kentucky 
sixteen years prior.88 The court applied the FEFJA without any choice-of-law 
analysis but noted that decisions in other jurisdictions interpreting how statutes of 
limitation would apply under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 
(on which the FEFJA was based) were remarkably inconsistent.89  
The case, however, took a left turn when it was time to make a final 
determination. Instead of ruling whether the domesticated judgment was subject to 
a five-year or twenty-year limitation period, the court resolved that under the FEFJA, 
a domesticated judgment “merely picks up where it was left off in the state where 
rendered,” and thus the forum state’s statute of limitations does not apply.90 It went 
on to conclude that based on the “plain language” of the FEFJA, Florida’s statute of 
limitations does not apply to the domesticated judgment and thus is subject to 
Kentucky’s own fifteen-year statute of limitations.91 The decision imposes an 
awkward scheme where the bankruptcy court must apparently look to the law of the 
state where the judgment was originally entered to determine how much “life” the 
judgment has left under that state’s statute of limitations. However, before the court 
 ________________________  
 82. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Alford (In re Alford), 308 B.R. 563, 568 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2002). 
 83. Id.  
 84. In re Goodwin, 325 B.R. at 329.  
 85. In re Alford, 308 B.R. at 565.  
 86. Policemen’s & Firefighters’ Ret. Fund of Covington, Ky. v. Tranter (In re Tranter), 245 B.R. 419, 420 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000). 
 87. See id. at 419–20. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 421. 
 90. Id. (quoting Wright v. Trust Co. Bank, 466 S.E.2d 74, 75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (interpreting Georgia’s 
uniform law)).  
 91. Id. at 422 (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.090 (LexisNexis 2000)).  
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is even able to get to that point, it must inquire into the forum state’s procedure for 
domesticating foreign judgments and determine if that state’s limitation statute 
applies.92 This is undoubtedly a legally cumbersome procedure for a court to use on 
a case-by-case basis. Subsequent courts have disagreed, at least implicitly, with 
Tranter, and have instead held that a foreign judgment domesticated in Florida under 
the FEFJA is subject to Florida’s twenty-year limitation period.93 One hopes that the 
Tranter decision is simply an anomaly.94 
Another wrinkle that can be added to this already-confusing mélange is the 
concept of an “action on a judgment,” which appears in sections 95.11(1) and (2) of 
the Florida Statutes. Specifically, Florida’s statute of limitations—whether it is five 
years or twenty years—is only implicated upon “[a]n action on a judgment.”95 This 
may not appear to be a major distinction on its face, but some courts have used this 
turn of phrase to greatly narrow section 95.11’s effectiveness.96 In Burshan v. 
National Union Fire Insurance Co., the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal held 
that Florida’s statute of limitations did not bar a garnishment proceeding in a Florida 
federal court where the writ was issued over eleven years after the original federal 
judgment.97 There the creditor obtained a judgment from a New York federal court 
in 1987 and registered that judgment in 1993 in the Southern District of Florida 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963,98 which enables the judgment to “have the same effect 
as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered.”99 In this way, the 
statute acts much in the same way as the FEFJA does for domesticating foreign 
judgments in the State of Florida.  
The Burshan court opined that federal courts had interpreted the words “action 
on a judgment” too broadly, thereby applying the statute of limitations to situations 
that did not call for such a restraint.100 The Fourth District pointed its finger at the 
First District’s Kiesel decision as being the source of this erroneous interpretation, 
instead of limiting the phrase to its proper “precise meaning as a common law cause 
of action.”101 The court defined this cause of action as the method of obtaining “a 
new judgment which will facilitate the ultimate goal of securing satisfaction of the 
original cause of action” and can be used to renew the limitation period of an old 
 ________________________  
 92. See In re Tranter, 245 B.R. at 422.  
 93. See, e.g., Hess v. Patrick, 164 So. 3d 19, 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Wiley, 145 
So. 3d 946, 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); 645 W. 44th St. Assocs. v. Koch, No. 13-61475, 2014 WL 1652035, at 
*2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2014).  
 94. Unfortunately, anomalous decisions still pop up on occasion. In the same year as the Tranter case, the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida enforced a California judgment against a debtor because that 
debtor had only recently established his residency in Florida. See In re Conrad, 252 B.R. 559, 561 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2000). The court determined that the intent of the Florida legislature was that the statute of limitations “should not 
begin to run until the time when the courts of this state had jurisdiction to adjudicate between the parties upon a 
particular cause of action.” Id. (citing Van Deren v. Lory, 100 So. 794 (Fla. 1924)). This case appears to be an 
outlier, fortunately.  
 95. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(1)–(2) (2015).   
 96. See Burshan v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 805 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 97. Id. at 837.    
 98. Id. at 837–38. 
 99. Id. at 839 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000)).  
 100. See id. at 840.  
 101. Id.  
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judgment once the new judgment is obtained.102 After a lengthy historical lesson, the 
court held that “neither the 1999 garnishment proceeding nor the 1993 registration 
of the judgment under 28 U.S.C.A § 1963 was an ‘action on a judgment’ within the 
meaning of section 95.11(2)(a).”103 This put Burshan in direct conflict with the First 
District’s Kiesel opinion, which held that a creditor’s petition for writ of mandamus 
was barred by the five-year statute of limitations period because it was an action on 
a judgment of the Southern District of Florida.104 The First District also expressed 
disagreement with the Eleventh Circuit’s Bush decision, discussed supra, since it 
had ruled that post-judgment discovery in aid of execution was barred by section 
95.11(2)(a) and thus was an “action on a judgment.”105 
While neither Kiesel nor Burshan are bankruptcy cases, it is easy to see how the 
conflict they represent can potentially affect bankruptcy practitioners. If the phrase 
“action on a judgment” is to be construed as narrowly as the Burshan decision 
suggests, then Florida’s statute of limitations would likely never apply to a creditor’s 
claim in a bankruptcy estate. Under Burshan’s interpretation, the only action that 
would trigger section 95.11(2)(a) would be a traditional common law action to 
domesticate an out-of-state judgment in Florida. All other types of actions, including 
post-judgment discovery, writs of execution or garnishment, or claims in a 
bankruptcy proceeding, would potentially lack any kind of statute of limitation. At 
most, the action or claim would only be limited by the effectiveness of the judgment 
in the judgment’s home jurisdiction.106 At least one decision subsequent to Burshan 
has agreed with its logic with respect to proceedings in aid of execution.107 
The better reasoning would be to subject a creditor’s claims in bankruptcy to 
some kind of statute of limitations. Based on the overwhelming weight of decisional 
authority, as outlined herein, it seems that the applicable statute of limitations would 
be that of the forum state. But how should a “claim” based on a foreign judgment be 
viewed in bankruptcy: As a kind of independent cause of action, or as a method of 
execution? It is true that the filing of an independent suit based on a foreign judgment 
is fundamentally different than seeking to execute on that judgment in Florida.108 
However, there should be an incentive for creditors to swiftly seek enforcement of 
their judgments and not simply wait for a debtor to fall into bankruptcy.  
 ________________________  
 102. Burshan, 805 So. 2d at 841 (quoting Adams v. Adams, 691 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)). The 
only limitation on this cause of action, it seems, is that the merits of the original cause of action cannot be relitigated 
in the new action. See id. (citing Klee v. Cola, 401 So. 2d 871, 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).  
 103. Id. at 843.  
 104. Kiesel v. Graham, 388 So. 2d 594, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).  
 105. Burshan, 805 So. 2d at 844 (citing Balfour Beatty Bah., Ltd. v. Bush, 170 F.3d 1048, 1050–51 (11th Cir. 
1999)). The court also expressly disagreed with an opinion from the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of 
Florida, which held that Florida’s statute of limitations barred a garnishment proceeding. Id. (citing Kilby v. Ilgen 
(In re Kilby), 196 B.R. 627 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996)).  
 106. See FLA. STAT. § 95.10 (2015) (“When the cause of action arose in another state or territory of the United 
States, or in a foreign country, and its laws forbid the maintenance of the action because of lapse of time, no action 
shall be maintained in this state.”).  
 107. See Milliken & Co. v. Haima Grp. Corp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1376, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (holding 
that Florida’s five-year limitation period is inapplicable to a writ of garnishment issued more than five years after 
entry of foreign judgment).  
 108. See Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 61 So. 3d 1285, 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that post 
judgment proceedings “are merely continuations of an action, which create nothing anew, but may be said to 
reanimate that which before had existence”) (quotations omitted).  
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It is notable that the bankruptcy decisions surveyed, supra, largely ignore the 
distinction between a claim based on a foreign judgment and a normal post-judgment 
enforcement mechanism, such as a writ of garnishment. This may be a practical 
consideration given the volume of cases and claims handled by a typical bankruptcy 
court; an overly complicated analysis that requires judges to determine what 
constitutes an “action on a judgment” is probably not workable. A simpler solution 
would be to read the plain language of section 95.11—as it is understood by modern 
jurists—and apply a five-year limitation period for foreign judgments in a Florida 
bankruptcy proceeding, unless that foreign judgment had been duly registered 
pursuant to the FEFJA, making it a Florida judgment in every way.  
It also makes little practical or legal sense to distinguish a simple bankruptcy 
claim from an adversary proceeding to determine dischargeability. A creditor should 
not be penalized for taking a more “aggressive” posture in a bankruptcy proceeding 
by seeking additional relief. Even if a creditor’s six-year-old judgment is not barred 
by Florida’s statute of limitations in bankruptcy, filing an adversary proceeding does 
not suddenly change the character of the underlying judgment. In that instance, the 
claim’s enforceability should remain constant despite the creditor’s decision to seek 
a judgment of non-dischargeability.   
III. A BRIEF SURVEY OF RELEVANT DECISIONS OUTSIDE FLORIDA  
An analysis of federal court decisions outside Florida reveals an array of 
opinions on choice of law in bankruptcy. Several courts have blessed the use of a 
federal choice-of-law analysis in bankruptcy courts. In In re Lindsay, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was called upon to decide the applicable 
law for determining whether a foreclosure sale that took place in Texas resulted in a 
fraudulent conveyance with respect to the California bankruptcy proceeding.109 The 
Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]n federal question cases with exclusive jurisdiction in 
federal court, such as bankruptcy, the court should apply federal, not forum state, 
choice of law rules.”110 Forum shopping, the court reasoned, could be mitigated if 
federal courts are not bound by the forum state’s choice-of-law rules.111 It went on 
to hold that Texas law applied to the foreclosure, since the foreclosed real property 
was located in Texas.112 This result, however, appears to have been a fait accompli, 
since it does not seem likely that even a bankruptcy court applying California choice 
of law would have ended up using anything but Texas law, given the unique nature 
of real property.113 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Woods-Tucker 
Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Development Co.,114 declined to take a firm 
 ________________________  
 109. Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re Lindsay), 59 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 110. Id. at 948.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. The Ninth Circuit went on to confirm this sentiment, declaring that “[n]o serious argument can be made 
for applying the law of any state but Texas to the Texas real estate foreclosure.” See id. at 949.  
 114. Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp., v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981).  
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stance on either side. In that case, the court was asked whether a bankruptcy court in 
Texas was compelled to apply the law of Texas or Mississippi with respect to a loan 
transaction that had a Mississippi choice-of-law provision in the contract but whose 
terms were contradictory to Texas usury laws.115 While recognizing that neither the 
Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit had resolved the “threshold question” of whether 
a bankruptcy court must apply the choice of law of its forum state, it ultimately 
determined that application of a federal choice-of-law rule or the forum state’s 
choice-of-law rule would both lead to the same outcome.116 For this reason, the court 
declined to decide the dispute one way or the other. The United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Second117 and Seventh118 Circuits later came to similarly 
unsatisfying conclusions. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit came to a different 
conclusion in In re Merritt Dredging Co.119 There the creditor and bankruptcy trustee 
sought to determine their rights with respect to the debtor’s barge and to whether the 
law of South Carolina or Louisiana would apply.120 The Fourth Circuit ultimately 
determined that since “no overwhelming federal policy requires [the court] to 
formulate a choice-of-law rule as a matter of independent federal judgment,” then 
the bankruptcy court should use the choice of law of the forum state, in this case, 
South Carolina.121 Like the Lindsay decision, the Fourth Circuit cited uniformity as 
a compelling reason for its decision.122 But, rather than federal uniformity, the Fourth 
Circuit praised uniformity with the Supreme Court’s Klaxon decision insofar as a 
federal bankruptcy court’s application of its forum state’s choice-of-law rules would 
“enhance the predictability in an area where predictability is crucial.”123 This logic 
has its own merit, given that bankruptcy courts act similarly to courts sitting in 
diversity—they invariably are called upon to decide the property interests of parties 
located in more than one jurisdiction. And, the Fourth District concluded, “It would 
be anomalous to have the same property interest governed by the laws of one state 
in federal diversity proceedings and by the laws of another state where a federal court 
is sitting in bankruptcy.”124  
A survey of individual bankruptcy court decisions yields an even more diverse 
array of conclusions. Some courts have simply applied the forum state’s choice-of-
 ________________________  
 115. Id. at 745–46.   
 116. Id. at 748–49.   
 117. Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. (In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.), 
961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992) (“For purposes of this appeal, however, we need not untangle the interwoven 
features of state and federal law, for we discern no significant difference between the applicable federal and New 
York choice-of-law rules.”).  
 118. In re Morris, 30 F.3d 1578, 1582 (7th Cir. 1994) (determining that Iowa law would apply no matter what 
approach the court used); see also In re Jafari 569 F.3d 644, 651 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that Nevada substantive 
law would apply regardless of what choice-of-law rules were used).     
 119. Compliance Marine, Inc. v. Campbell (In re Merritt Dredging Co.), 839 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1988).  
 120. Id. at 204–05.  
 121. Id. at 206.  
 122. See id.; see also Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re Lindsay), 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 123. In re Merritt Dredging Co., 839 F.2d at 206. 
 124. Id. 
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law provisions.125 Other courts have instead conducted a federal choice-of-law 
analysis.126 Still other courts have avoided the issue by not affirmatively adopting 
one choice or the other.127 It is clear, then, that appellate courts have a long way to 
go in creating a unifying precedent with respect to choice-of-law analysis, since 
bankruptcy courts have been left to develop their own determinations based on the 
limited guidance from higher authorities.  
CONCLUSION 
Despite decades of indecision from all levels of courts—from bankruptcy courts 
to the Supreme Court of the United States——there is still little clarity on how 
federal courts sitting in bankruptcy must decide choice-of-law issues. The result is 
that debtors, creditors, and bankruptcy practitioners alike should all be cautious when 
approaching such an issue in a bankruptcy proceeding. As it so often seems, courts 
left to their own devices have managed to complicate a matter that could, in theory, 
be quite simple. For what it is worth, it is the author’s opinion that Klaxon had it 
right all along: bankruptcy courts, like federal courts sitting in diversity, must be 
cognizant of the fact that their task is to adjudicate a diverse array of interests in a 
relatively uniform manner and that this goal necessarily intersects with state law. 
Bankruptcy claims and bankruptcy assets do not cease to retain their essential 
character—derived from state property rights—simply because the debtor files a 
bankruptcy petition.  
It is also true that bankruptcy courts are, in essence, last-chance enforcement 
proceedings for creditors. For these reasons, it makes logical sense that bankruptcy 
courts should apply the procedural choice-of-law rules of the state in which they sit. 
Applying a federal choice-of-law framework would only further distance the 
bankruptcy proceeding from its core function as an arbiter of state-law property 
rights. This is why Florida bankruptcy courts should take the distinction between 
Florida’s five-year and twenty-year statute of limitation periods seriously and honor 
 ________________________  
 125. See, e.g., In re Eagle Enters., Inc., 223 B.R. 290, 292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (“In most instances 
bankruptcy courts rely on the rule observed by federal district courts hearing diversity cases and use the choice of 
law rules of the forum state.”); Tyler v. Putman (In re Putman), 110 B.R. 783, 793–94 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) 
(following the Merritt decision); In re Velasco, 13 B.R. 872, 874 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) (applying forum state’s 
choice of law without analysis); Thico Plan, Inc. v. Maplewood Poultry Co. (In re Maplewood Poultry Co.), 2 B.R. 
550, 553 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980) (“It is well settled in cases involving citizens of different states that the federal courts, 
including bankruptcy courts, must apply the substantive law of the forum state, including choice-of-law rules.”).  
 126. See, e.g., In re Segre’s Iron Works, Inc., 258 B.R. 547, 551 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2001) (“[T]he bankruptcy 
court should employ its power to apply and create federal common law by exercising its independent judgment as 
to choice of law.”); Limor v. Weinstein & Sutton (In re SMEC, Inc.), 160 B.R. 86, 91 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (“[T]he 
choice of law test that this district court sitting in bankruptcy will apply is the most significant contacts test.”); In re 
Ovetsky, 100 B.R. 115, 117 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (“If this Court is not compelled under Erie to apply Georgia 
law, it must examine the equities of the situation in order to determine which state’s law should control.”); Kaiser 
Steel Corp. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 87 B.R. 154, 160 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (conducting a “most 
significant contacts” approach); In re Barney Schogel, Inc., 12 B.R. 697, 700 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (relying on 
4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 70.49, p. 605–06 (14th ed. 1976)).  
 127. See, e.g., Dzibowski v. Friedlander (In re Friedlander Capital Mgmt. Corp.), 411 B.R. 434, 441 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 2009) (“Because the result is the same under the three approaches discussed below, the Court declines to 
adopt a particular approach in this case.”); Garrett v. Cook (In re Cook), No. 7-04-17704 SA, 2009 WL 2913241, at 
*3 (Bankr. D.N.M. Apr. 15, 2009) (determining that court would apply Nevada law regardless of whichever choice-
of-law analysis it used).  
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the state’s foreign judgment registration and enforcement statute. Doing so would 
create an easily workable analysis for bankruptcy courts: foreign judgments should 
be subject to Florida’s five-year limitation period, unless that judgment was properly 
registered in Florida pursuant to the FEFJA. In that case, the judgment should be 
treated like any other Florida judgment subject to a twenty-year limitation period. 
Any other type of analysis would needlessly complicate a fundamentally simple 
issue. If the former happens, bankruptcy attorneys and judges will be able to rest 
easy once again.  
 
16
Barry Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol21/iss2/1
